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R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali:  
Elements and Implications of the 
Supreme Court’s New Rigorous 




1. Markhali and Construction of Statutory Purpose 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Safarzadeh-
Markhali,1 might be assumed to be primarily of interest to criminal 
lawyers. However, the case’s greatest legal significance may lie in  
an altogether different and more technical realm of law: Statutory 
Interpretation. Specifically, Markhali decisively endorses a new rigorous 
approach to the matter of construing a legislative purpose. Previously, 
while the interpretation of legislation itself has been done employing 
rigorous general approaches based on long-established and progressively 
refined principles, construction of legislative objectives was typically done 
employing ad hoc approaches whose most common feature was the 
summary nature of the analysis. Markhali’s new framework recognizes 
this, and by contrast, may be characterized as a new “Rigorous Approach” 
to purpose construction that is distinct from prior approaches in at least 
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four ways: (1) it expressly acknowledges how critical construction of the 
statutory purpose is to the outcome of many claims; (2) it is self-conscious 
of the potential for a less-than-rigorous approach to be self-defeating, 
given that the reason for construing the legislative object is often for subtle 
comparisons with the legislative means, effects, etc.; (3) it sets out 
overarching parameters that help clarify what kind of “purpose” it is the 
goal of the construction exercise to determine; and (4) it delineates the 
relevant indicia, and prescribes an analytical procedure to scrutinize them, 
in construing the purpose. The result is an approach that is rigorous in that 
it is clear, systematic, capable of consistent application, and solicitous of 
in-depth adversarial argumentation and judicial justification. The advent of 
this new Rigorous Approach may have a significant and salutary impact on 
the adjudication of cases where the statutory purpose is a key issue. 
Notable examples surveyed here include the prominent Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms2 doctrines of overbreadth, discrimination, and 
proportionality. Markhali’s rigorous approach may be expected to structure 
the determination of legislative purpose, discipline argument and analysis 
concerning the purpose, and render the adjudication of claims which rely 
importantly on statutory objectives more transparent and predictable, thus 
strengthening the rule of law, and sheltering courts from unwelcome 
accusations of illegitimate policy-making.3 
2. Structure of this Chapter  
The discussion which follows proceeds in three parts. Part II outlines 
the Rigorous Approach to construction of statutory purpose which 
emerges from Markhali, and contrasts this with the Summary Approach 
to purpose construction typical of older cases. Part III assesses the impact 
of this development on future Charter jurisprudence, surveying several 
significant implications it may have in and around the adjudication of 
such claims. Part IV highlights a few key questions raised by the 
inauguration of the new Rigorous Approach, which remain to be worked 
out in subsequent case law. A short conclusion winds up the article’s 
discussion of these themes. 
                                                                                                                       
2
  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
3
  As the Court said it would (R. v. Moriarity, [2015] S.C.J. No. 55, 2015 SCC 55, [2015]  
3 S.C.R. 485 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Moriarity”]), I will use the words “purpose”, “objective”, and 
“object” interchangeably in this chapter. Likewise, no difference in meaning is intended by the 
variation between “statutory” and “legislative”. 
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II. THE NEW RIGOROUS APPROACH TO  
PURPOSE CONSTRUCTION 
1. The Rigorous Approach 
(a) Development 
The Rigorous Approach to construction of statutory purpose stems 
from the Supreme Court of Canada case, R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, a 
judgment of the full bench, under the pen of the Chief Justice. Seeds of 
the approach are present in two preceding unanimous judgments 
released around the time Markhali was heard in November 2015 (held 
concurrently under reserve until then): R. v. Moriarity4 (heard May 12, 
2015) and R. v. Appulonappa5 (heard February 17, 2015). Moriarity can 
be seen to ponder the theoretical rationales for a self-conscious approach 
to purpose construction, point out potential pitfalls of trying to skip over 
this, and delineate overarching parameters for the type of purpose the 
construction aims to identify. Appulonappa, meanwhile, preoccupies 
itself with mechanics of the construction, including the factors to be 
considered and the manner in which to analyze them, illustrating this  
in-depth Markhali, in which these various elements are confirmed, 
combined, endorsed, and extended presents the Charter case law with a 
new, complete, and authoritative approach to construction of the 
legislative objective. As will be detailed, this approach is characterized 
by its rigour, in comparison to more summary approaches often used in 
older cases. 
(b) Raison D’être 
The emergence of the new Rigorous Approach must be seen as 
reflecting a recognition of how pivotal a role is played in many cases by a 
court’s assertion of the statutory purpose. Markhali proclaims it as being 
“critically important” to correctly identify a law’s purpose.6 Similar 
sentiments are elaborated in Moriarity, which discusses a need to be 
“cautious”, to anchor the articulated purpose in the proper sources, and to 
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5
  [2015] S.C.J. No. 59, 2015 SCC 59, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 754 (S.C.C.), varg [2014] B.C.J. No. 
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6
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avoid pre-judging the purpose as this tends to short-circuit analysis of the 
larger legal issue at hand.7 Appulonappa says little about the importance of 
the construction exercise, but devotes 40 paragraphs, easily the longest  
of any of the cases, to investigation of the legislative objective. The Court 
had noted in that case that the scope of the impugned provision “is plain. 
The provision admits of no ambiguity.”8 Since the case consisted of an 
overbreadth claim, the result is that construction of the purpose then 
becomes dispositive, and therefore its construal comprises most of the 
Court’s analysis. As these recent judgments demonstrate, the emergence of 
the Rigorous Approach seems to coincide with recognition by the Court — 
confirmed in emphatic terms in Markhali — of the decisive importance in 
many cases of the construed legislative objective. 
(c) Overarching Parameters 
Markhali’s Rigorous Approach counsels attention to the theoretical 
rationales of the purpose construction, and commands conformity to a 
number of overarching parameters for the kind of purpose sought by the 
exercise. In this regard, Markhali’s Rigorous Approach reprises, summarizes, 
endorses, and extends some of the earlier commentary on these matters 
from Moriarity. 
One such guideline is that the purpose must be distinguished from 
what the legislation actually provides.9 In overbreadth cases, which 
compare these two elements, this might seem obvious. But there is a not-
irrational temptation to avoid diving into the murk of other possible 
indicators, and cling to the actual provision as terra firma self-evidence 
of its purpose. The Court noted this in Appulonappa, acknowledging that 
“[i]t may be argued that since Parliament used these words, that is what it 
intended”. However, the Court added that assumption is inadequate for it 
fails to consider “...[t]he potential for ‘failures of instrumental 
rationality’, in which a given law is not a rational means to achieve a 
legislative objective”. The possibility that the law as provided diverged 
from its objective requires courts to look further.10 In other words, the 
purpose is not always the same as what is provided because sometimes 
laws don’t do what they were made to do. 
                                                                                                                       
7
  Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 32. 
8
  Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at para. 72. 
9
  Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 26. See also Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 27. 
10
  Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at para. 36. 
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A second preliminary instruction provided by the Rigorous Approach 
for identifying the right kind of legislative object targeted by the exercise 
is that it be cast at an appropriate level of generality. High level 
constructions in the form of an “animating social value” are to be 
avoided for they are substantively too diffuse to usefully explain the 
particularity of statutory provisions (think of “the general welfare” as 
perhaps an extreme example of a purpose cast at too high of a level of 
generality). By the same token, also to be resisted are ground level 
constructions that do little more than restate the provision in synonymous 
terms, precluding any possible inquiry into differences between 
legislative aspiration and instrument.11 The proper pitch of the type of 
purpose sought is thus in between. 
A third parameter prescribed by Markhali is that the articulated 
purpose be in terms “both precise and succinct”.12 The Court gave 
several examples in Moriarity of objectives so expressed: protecting 
children from becoming victims of sexual offences (Heywood13); 
prosecuting and preventing terrorism (Khawaja14); criminalizing the 
parasitic, exploitative conduct of pimps (Bedford15); and preventing 
vulnerable persons from being induced to commit suicide at a time of 
weakness (Carter16). These examples, it said, illustrate how the goal of 
the construction exercise is to arrive at an articulated statement of 
purpose that captures “the main thrust of the law”.17 It may be wondered 
what supports the guidance ensconced in this directive? For starters, the 
succinctness criterion obviously contrasts with a more elaborate 
statement of purpose. Overly detailed statements of purpose, in turn, 
would seem to harbour two opposite risks of distortion: On one hand, if 
the extra detail is incorporated from what the law actually does, error 
may occur as a result of treating nuances which rather reflect legislative 
drafting rationales, practical considerations, or disconnects between 
provision and purpose of the “lost in translation” kind as nuances internal 
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  Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 27. See also Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 28. 
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  Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 28. See also Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 29. 
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  R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.), affg [1992] B.C.J. 
No. 2596 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Heywood”]. 
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  R. v. Khawaja, [2012] S.C.J. No. 69, 2012 SCC 69, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 555 (S.C.C.), affg 
[2010] O.J. No. 5471 (Ont. C.A.). 
15
  Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 
S.C.R. 1101 (S.C.C.), varg [2012] O.J. No. 1296 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Bedford”]. 
16
  Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 
331 (S.C.C.), revg [2013] B.C.J. No. 2227 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Carter”]. 
17
  Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 26. 
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to the purpose when in fact they were not. On the other hand, if the extra 
detail is imported from other sources of kinds like Parliamentary debates, 
public consultations, or international travaux préparatoires, the danger is 
that statements made as part of such deliberative processes, but which 
did not reflect the overall focus or the final political consensus, may be 
improperly treated as if they did. Likewise, if too much detail is 
incorporated into the objective from exhaustive legislative preambles, the 
risk is that the object of the specific provision at issue may be 
misleadingly compounded by expressed objectives which in fact are 
focused on other provisions within the larger legislative scheme. 
Succinctness therefore guards against the twin risks of either too readily 
accepting a provision’s terms as accurately reproducing the provision’s 
purpose, or else of overriding the true purpose by over-preoccupation 
with statements made in connection with but not reflective of “the main 
thrust”. An excessively detailed purpose of either kind could frustrate 
Charter analyses like overbreadth or the rational connection and minimal 
impairment branches of the Oakes18 proportionality test, as these all 
compare in some way what a law was meant to do with what it does. 
What of the “precision” that the same directive from Markhali demands 
of the articulated purpose, besides succinctness? Just as laws must not be 
vague,19 neither can the purpose be, when it is being construed in order to 
serve as an intelligible part of some larger legal analysis. And, if that 
analysis involves comparisons with what the law actually does, as the 
tests for the aforementioned Charter doctrines do, then all the more must 
the purpose be articulated precisely to allow for a comparison both full 
and fair. 
A fourth general rule that Markhali specifies for properly determining 
a statutory purpose is that the construction exercise in no way entails 
judging the appropriateness of the objective; the objective must be taken 
“at face value”.20 This is not to say that statutory purposes are blindly 
accepted as being constitutionally appropriate. Indeed, a legislative 
object of infringing a Charter right renders the relevant law invalid.21 
However, even where the legal issue before the court is precisely that 
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  R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.), affg [1983] O.J. No. 2501 
(Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Oakes”]. 
19
  R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] S.C.J. No. 67, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 
(S.C.C.), affg [1991] N.S.J. No. 169 (N.S.C.A.). 
20
  Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 29. See also Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 30. 
21
  R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.), affg 
[1983] A.J. No. 766 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “Big M”]. 
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question of whether the legislative object violates the Charter, the 
purpose must first be construed such as it is, before its compliance with 
the Charter can secondarily be assessed.22 
Markhali’s Rigorous Approach reveals, besides the above four 
enumerated propositions which draw on Moriarity, two additional 
guidelines superintending the exercise of construing a statutory purpose. 
Both of these reprise features of Appulonappa. 
These commence with the place, within the larger legal analysis for 
which the purpose is being construed, where the construction should 
properly be conducted. Markhali stipulates that it should be done “at the 
outset” of the analysis,23 confirming the Court’s earlier depiction of it in 
Appulonappa as “the first step”.24 If the larger Charter issue being 
analyzed is whether a rights limitation is proportionate, it is clear enough 
why construing the purpose must be done at the outset: The first leg of 
proportionality analysis asks whether the legislative objective is pressing 
and substantial. To answer whether it is pressing and substantial, the 
court must first have construed what the legislative objective is. It must 
likewise already have been construed to answer the second leg of the 
test, which queries whether the provision represents a rational means of 
achieving the determined objective. The same is once again true for the 
third leg of the test, which asks whether the provision limits the affected 
right as little as reasonably possible in pursuing its object. To take 
another example, if the legal issue at hand is assessing whether the 
purpose of a law is to infringe a Charter right, it will again be necessary 
to construe the purpose first. Meanwhile, for certain other Charter 
analyses, while it may not be strictly necessary to construe the purpose at 
the outset, there would seem strong rationales for doing so. To begin 
with, it is the most natural thing to do, since it mimics the legislative 
process being scrutinized — where the legislator starts with an objective, 
before translating that into legislation, and finally seeing its effects. In 
addition, it may help avoid the appearance that a desired outcome on the 
overall legal question may have steered the decision as to what the 
legislative object was. Consider overbreadth, for example. Moriarity 
notes that the means a law adopts “are usually easy to identify”, whereas 
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  Id., at paras. 48-53, 72. 
23
  Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 24. Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 24, uses the phrase 
“at the outset,” but does so in relation to both “purpose and effects.” The point there is that the two 
aspects must be determined before they are compared, not that purpose should be construed before 
the scope or “effects” are. 
24
  Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at para. 31. 
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“[t]he objective of the challenged provision may be more difficult to 
identify and articulate.”25 Since the purpose is therefore the more 
contestable part, if it is construed after the means have already been 
articulated, the outcome will be immediately evident, so that the purpose 
construction risks being experienced by the reader like an exercise of 
justifying an outcome already in mind, rather than an open-minded and 
even-handed analysis. By contrast, if the purpose is construed first, 
during which the judgment has to that point been silent as to the scope of 
the provision, it tends to create the opposite effect — the iconography of 
law, after all, presents justice as blind. 
The other, and final, overarching parameter set out by Markhali’s 
Rigorous Approach springs from recognition of the fact that complex 
legislation often has more than one objective. In Appulonappa, this point 
was emphasized on three occasions, and a directive added that in such 
case “the way forward lies in an interpretation which harmonizes” the 
multiple objectives, “that avoids conflict and gives expression to each... 
read together in this way”.26 Markhali does not expressly make the same 
point a fourth time, but unmistakably endorses this as an essential 
element of properly construing a purpose, as it carries out a lengthy 
harmonization process: This begins with acknowledging six isolable 
objectives of the legislation at issue in Markhali: public confidence in the 
justice system; public safety from chronic/violent offenders; increased 
rehabilitation, retribution, transparency in the pre-credit system; and 
avoiding manipulation of the system. Over the course of 11 paragraphs, 
these are then worked through, providing a concrete illustration of how 
the harmonization directive takes shape in a given case.27 Thus, the 
public confidence objective is given expression as the animating social 
value, but is too general to be the purpose targeted by the construction. 
The next two from the above list are combined and together determined 
to be the main thrust sought by the construction exercise: “to enhance 
public safety and security by increasing violent and chronic offenders’ 
access to rehabilitation programs.” Conflict with the last three objectives 
is resolved by accepting them as valid but peripheral — outside the main 
thrust which the construction seeks, in other words. More specifically, it 
is noted that retribution occupies a minor role in the ministerial record, 
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  Moriarity, supra, note 3, at paras. 25-26. 
26
  Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at paras. 45, 51, 57. 
27
  Markhali, supra, note 1, at 37-47. 
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while transparency and avoiding manipulation seem more relevant to 
measures from the overall scheme other than those centrally at issue.28 
Together, the above overarching guidelines provided by Markhali’s 
Rigorous Approach operate to help ensure that the often pivotal task of 
determining a legislative objective be done in an intensely self-conscious 
manner, with awareness of and instructions for avoiding potential 
pitfalls, and tips for finding the right kind of purpose that the 
construction exercise aims to identify. In all these ways, this general 
guidance contributes to a rigorous approach to construing the legislative 
object, in contrast to summary approaches used previously. 
(d) Mechanics  
Besides these overarching parameters, Markhali also gives us the 
actual mechanics it endorses for construing a purpose. This includes the 
sources to be looked to in determining the purpose, the method by which 
to examine them, and the thoroughness with which they should be 
investigated. In these respects, Markhali’s Rigorous Approach follows, 
formalizes, builds upon, and refines the construction found in 
Appulonappa. 
(i) Accepted “Indicia of Purpose”29 
Markhali expressly enumerates three sets of indicators to be 
considered in its Rigorous Approach to construing a statutory purpose:  
(i) statements of purpose in the legislation; (ii) the text, legislative 
context, and scheme of the legislation; and (iii) the legislative history, 
evolution, and other evidence extrinsic to the legislation itself.30 These 
same sets of factors can be found in the judgments across the triad 
discussed.31 Its earlier cases, Moriarity and Appulonappa, in turn cite as 
authority for use of these sources as evidence of legislative purpose 
Professor Ruth Sullivan’s leading text on Statutory Interpretation in 
Canada, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes.32  
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  Id. 
29
  Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at para., 34. 
30
  Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 31. 
31
  See Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 31, and Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at para. 33. 
32
  Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed. (Markham: LexisNexis, 
2014) [hereinafter “Sullivan”]. See Moriarity, id.; Appulonappa, id. 
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Examining Markhali’s classification of the indicators to be considered 
by its Rigorous Approach, at least two rationales are immediately 
apparent. Highlighting them may help to make the analytical structure of 
the Approach conceptually more explicit and intelligible to parties to 
litigation, and thus easier to recall and adhere to in researching evidence 
and presenting arguments concerning the purpose in court. To begin with, 
the first two enumerated categories both consist of sources of evidence 
intrinsic to the legislation. Statements of objectives in the legislation 
comprise direct evidence of purpose intrinsic to the legislation.33 The 
text, legislative context, and scheme of the legislation are forms of 
indirect evidence of purpose intrinsic to the legislation. The third 
category consists of all extrinsic evidence. The extrinsic sources given as 
examples and considered in Markhali, namely the history and evolution 
of the legislation,34 will each be direct where they pertain to statements 
of purpose from the source in question, and indirect where they rely on 
other types of statements relevant to the purpose from the source in 
question. 
As far as the order or logic of enumeration of these categories within 
Markhali’s Rigorous Approach, it seems reasonable to conclude based on 
ordinary principles of evidence that it reflects a hierarchy of general 
reliability: within intrinsic, direct before indirect; all types of intrinsic 
before extrinsic; and no need to separate out direct extrinsic from indirect 
extrinsic, because their comparative remoteness as extrinsic sources is 
their most salient characteristic, diminishing the relative significance of 
whether they are direct or indirect. These can only be generalizations,  
for in any given case, the reliability of a particular source or category 
may be frustrated or magnified. Indeed, in Markhali, although the Court 
notes that as a general matter, the sources it draws upon from the third 
category “may be rhetorical and imprecise”, it is these sources that, given 
the concrete evidence available, become most decisive of the purpose 
construed in that particular matter.35 
Where do prior case precedents fit amongst the categories? A 
precedent’s role appears to vary according to where its relevance lies. If 
the precedent contains a conclusion potentially on the overall purpose, it 
is dealt with apart from any of the specific categories, so that the court 
                                                                                                                       
33
  Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 32 uses the term “explicit” to similar effect. 
34
  Id., at para. 31. 
35
  Id., at para. 36. 
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can investigate whether the purpose is “settle[d]” by stare decisis.36 If the 
precedent contains conclusions relevant to only one or more of the 
categories of evidence of purpose, it is considered within the examination 
of those, as for instance the Summers precedent is in Markhali.37  
Elaborating in more detail, now, the content of each of the categories 
of the Rigorous Approach, the legislative statements of purpose that 
comprise the first category may be found at the beginning of a statute, in 
the section in which the provision in question is found, in sections 
containing interpretive guidelines, or in amendments to the statute.38 This 
category has been called the first,39 “most direct and authoritative 
evidence” of legislative purpose.40 However, it does not always yield 
clear answers in practice. For example, in Markhali, the Court looked at 
this source, but found no statement of objectives in the legislation.41 
Meanwhile, in Appulonappa, the legislation contained multiple 
statements of purpose, which the Court sought to harmonize,42 a difficult 
task which sometimes requires resort in turn to the other categories of 
sources for illumination. 
The second category consists of the “contextual matrix”43 of the 
purpose that is still intrinsic to the legislation. Under this rubric, 
Markhali, for instance, scrutinized the Criminal Code provision on 
endorsement where detainees are denied bail due to prior convictions 
(section 515(9.1)).44 This endorsement provision was the key element of 
the legislative context of the impugned provision (section 719(3.1)) 
which capped credit for pre-sentence custody in the event of such an 
                                                                                                                       
36
  See discussion in Moriarity, supra, note 3, at paras. 42-44, 47 of R. v. Généreux, [1992] 
S.C.J. No. 10, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259 (S.C.C.), revg [1990] C.M.A.J. No. 1 (C.M.A.C.). 
37
  Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 34. The statements from R. v. Summers, [2014] S.C.J. 
No. 26, 2016 SCC 26 (S.C.C.), are considered within the second category of indirect intrinsic 
evidence. Arguably, they should have been considered in the first category, since the statements in 
question are statements of purpose which the Summers Court imputed to the legislation. However, as 
the Markhali Court notes that the construction was part of an exercise of broader statutory 
interpretation, the Markhali Court may have had in mind Summers wider commentary on the scheme 
in placing it in that category. 
38
  Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at paras. 49, 53-54. 
39
  Markhali, supra, note 1, at paras. 31, 32. 
40
  Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at para. 49, quoting Sullivan, supra, note 32, at 274-76. 
41
  Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 32. The case does make reference to the title of the Act, 
but without obtaining great illumination. The titles to certain statutes would seem to fall in between 
statements of purpose and legislative context, which may explain why this source is referred to 
where it is within Markhali’s analysis. 
42
  Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at paras. 45, 49-57. 
43
  Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 33. 
44
  Id., at para. 35; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
234 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2017) 77 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
endorsement. While it may seem puzzling that the Court also referred to 
its scrutiny of the endorsement provision rather than the cap provision as 
the “text” factor, the latter incorporated by reference the former, whose 
breadth was in question in its triggering the cap’s effects, as the Court 
explained earlier.45 Both prior cases of the triad also saw the text and 
legislative context considered (separately, in each case) within this 
category of sources recognized by the Rigorous Approach.46 
The third category under the Rigorous Approach consists of evidence 
extrinsic to the actual and current legislation. This includes materials 
closely related to the legislation, such as prior versions of it, or minutes 
from the debates and committee meetings that led to it. Of the first  
of these, the Court in Markhali looked to but found little evidence of 
legislative evolution.47 An example of such an analysis can be found, 
however, in Appulonappa, where the Court scrutinizes successive 
changes in the prohibitions on migrant smuggling dating back a century, 
and derives from this evolution an increasing desire by the legislator to 
distinguish between incidental or humanitarian forms of aid versus 
crime-related activities contributing to the entry of undocumented 
migrants.48 Turning to the legislative history, it is this factor that 
Markhali considers at greatest length,49 finding in the records of 
Parliamentary committee meetings evidence showing an objective of 
bolstering public safety by enhancing rehabilitation for violent and 
chronic offenders.50 The Court had, as mentioned, acknowledged the 
perils of Hansard evidence, but these perils may have been partially 
muted by the Court’s particular focus on explanations by the minister 
responsible, rather than other potentially less reliable comments from the 
Parliamentary record. In this respect, the Court said: “providing 
information and explanations of proposed legislation is an important 
ministerial responsibility, and courts rightly look to it in determining the 
purpose”.51 Both Moriarity and Appulonappa also examined the 
Parliamentary debate history.52 Another extrinsic source is international 
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  Id., at paras. 10-11. 
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  Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 36 (text) and paras. 36-40 (legislative context); 
Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at paras. 35-39 (text) and paras. 46-48 (legislative context). 
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  Markhali, supra, note 1, at para. 36. 
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21, at paras. 48-53. 
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  Markhali, supra, note 1, at paras. 36-44. 
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  Id., at para. 47. 
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  Id., at para. 36. 
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  Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 45; Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at paras. 64-69. 
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law. The Court investigated this factor in Appulonappa, explaining that 
“[w]here legislation is enacted in the context of international 
commitments, international law may also be of assistance” in construing 
the legislative object.53 In combination, these sources remain far from 
exhaustive of the category of extrinsic materials, as Moriarity noted, 
observing that “[c]ourts have used many sources to determine legislative 
purpose”.54 For instance, in Chartrand,55 which Appulonappa cites, 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. looked at the social context in which the enactment 
was made, referencing, for example, academic texts and government-
published relevant statistical evidence.56 Whether the new Rigorous 
Approach inaugurated by Markhali will stretch far enough to encompass 
these forms of extrinsic sources or others is yet to be determined. 
Beyond the above catalogue of sources, it is important to note that it is 
a holistic approach to the combined import of all the various sources that 
enables the purpose to emerge using the Rigorous Approach.57 Alone, each 
source has its own frailties, as Moriarity points out, noting, for instance, 
that “as Prof. Sullivan wisely observes, legislative statements of purpose 
may be vague and incomplete, and inferences of legislative purpose [from 
indirect sources] may be subjective and prone to error”.58  
(ii)  Manner in Which to Analyze the Sources 
Markhali also reveals the manner in which the sources are to be 
analyzed under the Rigorous Approach. Here, Markhali departs from the 
analytical structure used earlier in Moriarity.  
Moriarity employed an analytical structure of: (i) addressing the 
appellants’ position on the purpose; (ii) addressing the respondents’ 
position on the purpose; and lastly (iii) stating the Court’s conclusion as 
to the purpose.59 Within this structure, the sources are turned to and 
discussed in relation to the parties’ contentions regarding them.60 Where 
the court responds to both parties’ contentions concerning the same  
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  Appulonappa, supra, note 5, at paras. 33, 40-44. 
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  Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 31. 
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  R. v. Chartrand, [1994] S.C.J. No. 67, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 864, at 880-82 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Chartrand”]. 
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  Id. 
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  See, for example, Moriarity, supra, note 3, at para. 32 referring to the “full context”. 
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  Id., at para. 31. 
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  Id., at paras. 34-48. 
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  Id., at paras. 35-45. 
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source, this requires the court to return to the source a second time. Thus, 
for example, in Moriarity, the Généreux precedent is discussed under the 
section pertaining to the appellants and again that of the respondents.61 In 
Moriarity, the lower court’s assertions were also looked at — together 
with the appellants’ because of similarity in their positions.62 Had their 
positions been more different, or had interveners been present and taken 
again quite different positions, it is uncertain whether the analysis would 
have required sections for each, considering the same sources of 
indicators of purpose each time. At the end of the sections containing the 
expressions of and responses to the parties’ positions and arguments 
regarding the sources, Moriarity then stated the Court’s own view of the 
purpose in a concluding paragraph.63 
By contrast, Markhali follows an analytical structure that corresponds 
to its enumerated categorization of the authoritative sources: (i) legislative 
statements of purpose; (ii) the text, legislative context and scheme; and 
(iii) extrinsic sources.64 A single comprehensive analysis of each source 
is conducted, following the enumerated order, each in turn.65 The central 
focus is simply on emergent implications for the purpose that the court 
must construe, rather than on seeking evidence from the sources that 
supports or refutes the parties’ claims regarding it.66 Nevertheless, 
inevitably, within the analysis of each source, the examination and 
discussion of the sources does implicitly (and sometimes quite directly, 
sometimes less directly) respond to the positions of the parties and lower 
courts. Occasionally the analysis may also do so explicitly, as we see in 
Appulonappa, which employed a similar analytical structure, but lacked 
the canonical formulation and adherence to the prescribed order of 
consideration of sources additionally incorporated into the Rigorous 
Approach set out in Markhali.67 
The analytical structure in Markhali is rigorous in that the structure 
inherently concentrates attention on all sources, and on all evidence of 
purpose attainable from each source, diminishing the risk of overlooking 
some source or some relevant evidence from a source. This is particularly 
important given the parties’ inherent interest in proposing self-serving 
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  Id., at paras. 41-44, 47. 
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positions, which may well turn out sometimes to be opposite extremes — 
as the Court indeed concluded the parties’ positions were in Moriarity.68 
Further, from case to case, more consistent results are likely to be 
achieved through an analytical scheme focused on the authoritative 
sources rather than parties’ arguments. The approach is also rigorous in 
discharging the court’s obligation of justification: unlike the party-
focused analytical scheme, where the discussion focuses on rejecting the 
parties’ contentions, Markhali’s source-focused analytical scheme leads 
to and supports the Court’s ultimate conclusion in which the analysis 
culminates. In all these respects, the analytical structure of Markhali’s 
approach to purpose construction parallels the accepted rigorous 
approaches to statutory interpretation. 
(iii)  Depth of Analysis 
Markhali’s Rigorous Approach is also marked by its consideration 
of the relevant indicators in a depth that befits the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of the “critical importance” of purpose constructions in 
many cases. While in Markhali itself, few of the consulted sources in 
fact disclosed relevant evidence, this depth was demonstrated through 
the comprehensive and meticulous examination of the legislative 
history. The Court devoted 10 paragraphs to its scrutiny, quoting the 
record six times, harmonizing conflicting pieces of evidence, posing 
and answering questions about the best ways of interpreting that 
evidence.69 Blessed with access to more types of relevant evidence, one 
finds in Appulonappa a fuller picture of the thoroughness that 
characterizes the Rigorous Approach endorsed in Markhali. The Court 
in that case having identified, as mentioned earlier, the purpose as the 
central legal issue to be analyzed, careful inquiry attends each source. 
Thus, for example, it provides an average of six paragraphs to each of 
the authoritative sources available: legislative statements of object, the 
text, the legislative context, legislative evolution, legislative history, 
and international law.70 
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  Moriarity, supra, note 3, at paras. 20-21, 47. 
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  Markhali, supra, note 1, at paras. 36-44, 47. 
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2. The Summary Approach 
(a) The Old Regime 
The Rigorous Approach to purpose construction laid down in 
Markhali contrasts with the typical practice of Canadian courts prior to 
the Markhali triad. While one can find considerable variability in the 
specific analysis used in one or another of the older cases, generally-
speaking — and beyond inevitable exceptions71 — these share a number 
of common features which in combination describe a Summary 
Approach opposite of the Rigorous Approach. The diversity of these 
cases and contexts makes choosing a truly representative set impossible. 
Thus, in order to illustrate these points, I draw on three example cases — 
Heywood,72 Law,73 and Lola74 — that at least exhibit different modes of 
analysis in construals used for different Charter doctrines, but in all of 
which, the construed purpose was pivotal to the outcome of the case. 
(b) Three Examples 
Heywood is the seminal case on overbreadth, whereby the constitutional 
validity of a law hangs on a comparison between legislative means and 
objective. The judgment was a 5:4 split, where the majority and the 
dissent disagreed on the object, and as a result, on whether the law was 
unconstitutional. Those implications riding on it, the majority’s purpose 
analysis consisted of a conclusory statement and invocation of the text, 
articulated, in one instance, as follows:  
The purpose of s. 179(1)(b) is to protect children from becoming victims 
of sexual offences. This is apparent from the prohibition which applies to 
places where children are very likely to be found.75 
A very similar, but slightly longer, passage listed the places in 
question.76 The dissent’s more substantial purpose analysis focused 
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  See, for example, Chartrand, supra, note 55; R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 
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predominantly on expert witness testimony,77 a source whose status is 
uncertain as yet under the new regime introduced in Markhali. 
Law, an important case in the development of the Supreme Court’s 
equality jurisprudence, was notable in its repeated highlighting of the 
importance of the legislative objective to whether differential treatment is 
discriminatory.78 The case made no mention, however, of the importance 
of how that purpose is construed. The outcome in Law in fact came down 
to the statutory purpose construed by the Court. Analysis of the purpose 
consisted of stating the positions of the claimant and the government, and 
then asserting the Court’s conclusion.79 Sources mentioned were Hansard 
proffered by the claimant,80 the claimant’s admission before the Court 
that she agreed with part of the Government’s position,81 and judicial 
notice taken by the Court, supported by precedents.82 There were in fact 
two ways in which the object thus construed resulted in rejection of the 
claim in Law. One was that denying younger widow(er)s a survivor 
benefit available to older widow(er)s did not substantively discriminate 
against younger ones because they were better able to replace the income 
of a deceased spouse on their own over the long-term, and the statutory 
aim, as asserted by the Government and accepted by the Court, was long-
term not immediate need.83 The other was that the Court construed the 
legislation as having an objective of ameliorating the situation of older 
widow(er)s, a group which the Court concluded through judicial notice 
was in greater need than younger ones.84 Under the test applied, such a 
purpose was a factor in whether legislation was discriminatory.85 
Lola was a case concerning unmarried spouses’ obligations, where the 
purpose was key not only to whether the scheme breached the right to 
non-discrimination, but also whether the infringement of that right was 
proportionate. The Court was split in four different opinions. Justice 
LeBel and McLachlin C.J.C. saw the objective as couples’ autonomy to 
choose the regime of spousal obligations they prefer, while Abella J. 
concluded that the objective was protecting vulnerable spouses, and 
Deschamps J. construed some of the provisions as autonomist and some 
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  Law, supra, note 73. 
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protective.86 Justice LeBel’s discussion did not clearly distinguish its 
analysis of purpose versus content versus effects; as regards the purpose, 
it was also preoccupied with whether the purpose was discriminatory, 
without independently construing the purpose.87 The evidence most 
related to the objective comprised a case precedent and the legislative 
history.88 While Abella J.’s opinion had recourse to numerous sources 
(the legislative context, academic commentaries, law commission 
reports, precedents, law and jurisprudence from other jurisdictions, 
legislative history, social history), the analytical structure governing its 
examination of them was unclear as it moved back and forth among 
them. Also unknown was what relative authority or weight the analysis 
gave to the different categories of sources, although law commission 
reports and cases from outside jurisdictions figured prominently.89 The 
case outcome came down to the opinion of McLachlin C.J.C., whose 
conclusion that the scheme was discriminatory in effect though not in 
purpose created a 5:4 majority that found a prima facie infringement, but 
whose conclusion that the infringement was proportionate produced a 5:4 
majority upholding the legislation. At the pivotal minimal impairment 
step of proportionality analysis, a subtle difference in construed purpose 
was decisive: While Abella and Deschamps JJ. pointed to ways one 
could preserve autonomy while impairing the section 15(1) right less, the 
Chief Justice noted that these didn’t satisfy the test, for they distorted the 
statutory objective, being to provide couples not merely some measure of 
autonomy but maximizing their autonomy.90 
(c) Common Features 
Common to these three example cases are features of the Summary 
Approach that dominated purpose construction in the jurisprudence prior 
to the Markhali triad. 
For starters, they lack a robust self-consciousness about the 
construction exercise and its importance. Even when the importance of 
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  Lola, supra, note 74, at paras. 254-257 (LeBel J.), paras. 413, 435-436, 442 (McLachlin 
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the purpose is recognized, as it is implicitly by the dissent in Heywood, 
and explicitly by all in both Law and Lola, no similar recognition is 
apparent as regards the construction.  
The overarching parameters of the Rigorous Approach, designed to 
focus attention on the theoretical rationales of the construction exercise 
while keeping a wary eye out for practical pitfalls, are therefore notably 
absent from the Summary Approach. Hence, in Lola, the legislative 
object and effects are regularly conflated by three of the four opinions, 
even while a conclusion by the fourth opinion that the legislation is 
discriminatory in effect but not in purpose is what decides the case 
outcome. In Law, we see the two aspects of the construed purpose cast in 
too general terms — older versus younger widow(er)s, ameliorative 
purpose versus lessening dignity — to actually rule out the nuance 
suggested by the claimant: that the statutory aim was to ameliorate the 
situation of those widow(er)s most in need91 (including long-term), and 
that this would include not just older widow(er)s but also a subclass of 
younger widow(er)s not far from the age threshold and having other 
characteristics pushing them into the group most necessitous whose 
situation the aim was to ameliorate. The legislation’s distinction by age 
would thus discriminate in effect, though not purpose, in the same way 
McLachlin C.J.C. concluded that the claimant suffered discrimination in 
Lola. If this is so, Law should have instead been resolved at the 
proportionality stage, the infringement justified on the basis that a too 
complicated system of determining need would make the whole 
ameliorative scheme unworkable. Returning to Lola, the dissenting 
opinions’ insufficient appreciation of the need for precision regarding the 
purpose led them at the minimal impairment stage to rest their position 
on the possibility of alternate schemes that would lessen the infringement 
but also lessen autonomy, thus posing no challenge to a majority that had 
concluded that the legislative objective was to maximize autonomy. 
Again in Lola, the abiding preoccupation in LeBel J.’s reasons with 
judging the purpose as innocent of any discriminatory intent overlooked, 
even as it provided a voluminous and expert survey of the legislative 
background, the possibility that an objectively-presented clear 
construction of the purpose may have done more to persuade, and 
resulted in a less fractured Court. In Heywood, the cursory manner in 
which the majority addressed the critical question of the purpose was 
likely in part because it was done in the middle of, and as part of, 
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interpreting the statute, rather than construing the objective first, 
whereby its importance to analyzing and justifying a conclusion on 
overbreadth would presumably have encouraged a more substantial 
analysis. Lastly, the potential flaw in Law alluded to earlier could likely 
have been avoided had the Court tasked itself with harmonizing long-
term need as an aspect of the purpose with the aspect of intending to help 
those most in need, a more nuanced group than just older versus younger, 
being the kind of generalization on an enumerated ground (age) that one 
expects should only be upheld where justified via section 1 of the Charter 
(or, where applicable, the affirmative action provision, section 15(2)). 
The example cases also illustrate how the mechanics of the Summary 
Approach diverge from those of Markhali’s Rigorous Approach. As 
detailed, the opinions examined few sources of evidence of purpose. The 
exception to that was Abella J.’s reasons in Lola. Those reasons considered 
some of the indicia of purpose recognized as authoritative by the 
Markhali triad, but also some factors (law commission reports, law and 
jurisprudence from outside the jurisdiction, academic commentaries, 
social history) not yet considered under the Markhali regime. Likewise 
uncertain is what recourse the Rigorous Approach may or may not permit 
to expert witness testimony, a focus of the Heywood dissent. What these 
preceding comments further reveal is the disparity and unpredictability 
of which factors, besides the number of factors, the Summary Approach 
might call upon in purpose constructions. Beyond the sources, the 
example cases illustrate how the Summary Approach eschews analytical 
structure in the purpose construction — including where the same cases 
do strongly adhere to that characteristic in interpreting the statute itself. 
Further, the Summary Approach is widely inconsistent, but typically 
incomplete, in its commitment to examining any particular source. 
Overall the analysis is often cursory. Where it is not, its length frequently 
comprises long descriptive passages on, for instance the legislative 
history, rarely interrupted by analysis, which is instead left to a summary 
statement at the end of it.  
In sum, the qualities that define the Rigorous Approach — reflective, 
cautious, comprehensive, disciplined, and analytically deep — are absent 
from the Summary Approach. The latter’s opposite qualities could be 
cast in virtuous terms — simple, quick, free, flexible, and efficient. But 
they could also be seen, in comparison both to the Rigorous Approach to 
purpose construction, and to the much longer-endorsed rigorous 
approaches to statutory interpretation, as far too “fast and loose”. 
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW RIGOROUS APPROACH TO  
PURPOSE CONSTRUCTION FOR FUTURE  
CHARTER JURISPRUDENCE 
1. Some Notable Charter Analyses Potentially Impacted by the 
New Approach 
The advent of a new approach to purpose construction may impact a 
number of legal analyses prescribed by Canadian Charter jurisprudence 
within which statutory purpose plays an important role. The following 
are a few noteworthy examples. 
(a) Overbreadth 
Overbreadth directly compares the scope of a law with its object,  
so that any law the doctrine is applicable to will be declared 
unconstitutional if that “law goes too far and interferes with some 
conduct that bears no connection to its objective.”92 A principle of 
fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter, it applies to any law 
which may impinge on an individual’s life, liberty or security interests. 
Though its early career was relatively inauspicious, overbreadth  
has emerged in recent years as one of the most potent bases for 
challenging legislation under the Charter. Some prominent examples  
of its successful invocation by claimants in recent years include  
Bedford (prostitution), Carter93 (assisted suicide), Appulonappa (human 
smuggling), and Markhali (sentencing). Since it is unlikely that a law 
which fails section 7 can be saved under section 1,94 a successful claim 
need only show the said disparity between the object and scope of the 
relevant legislation. As Markhali and Moriarity noted, the construed 
purpose then becomes critically important to the subtle comparison that 
answers the question of the legislation’s validity, while the analysis that 
led to it becomes equally important to a court’s justification of that 
conclusion. It is surely no coincidence, therefore, that it was within a 
line of cases concerning overbreadth that the Rigorous Approach 
emerged, with the careful attention and systematic investigation the  
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Approach brings to the question of the statutory objective. Notably, this 
Rigorous Approach does not appear to have altered in any way the 
substantive threshold that must be met. Both Markhali and 
Appulonappa saw laws declared overbroad, while in Moriarity the law 
was upheld. Rather, as with the similar rigour that guides accepted 
approaches to statutory interpretation, what Markhali’s approach offers 
is greater confidence — both at the stage of investigation, and at the 
stage of justification — that whatever conclusion is reached on the 
purpose is correct.  
(b) Discrimination 
Whether differential treatment prescribed by law is discriminatory 
under the Charter’s section 15(1) right to equality depends, besides 
effects, on the objective of the law. The Law and Lola cases discussed 
earlier were both examples where the legislative object played a pivotal 
role in the resolution of the overall discrimination claim at bar. Another 
prominent example was Children’s Foundation,95 where the majority 
deemed that exempting the use of corrective force on children from 
assault laws was not discriminatory, because it was for the purpose of  
the guidance, discipline, and education of children.96 Meanwhile, the 
dissenting opinions viewed the objective as instead relating to relieving 
the liability of the adults who may be called upon to use such force.97  
Under the current test for discrimination, the second step asks 
whether the differential treatment perpetuates prejudice or disadvantage, 
whether by effect or purpose.98 In cases where it is the purpose that is 
impugned, it is therefore crucial, in answering whether it perpetuates 
prejudice or disadvantage, how the purpose is construed. Hard cases, like 
those mentioned, magnify the importance of that construal. In such cases, 
the Rigorous Approach introduced by Markhali provides greater security 
that the purpose will be accurately determined and thoroughly justified. 
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(c) Proportionality 
The most far-reaching section of the Charter is section 1, by which 
limitations of the other rights may be justified and thus upheld, failing 
which the law creating the limitation is otherwise unconstitutional. The 
justifiability of such limitations is determined by the proportionality 
analysis ordained in Oakes.99 The first three of the Oakes test’s four  
steps all depend on the statutory objective: The first inquires whether  
that objective is pressing and substantial. The second queries whether it 
is rationally connected to the legislative means supposed to give it effect. 
The third step, long the lynchpin of justification under Oakes, asks 
whether the limit is a minimal impairment of the right, given the 
legislative purpose. In practice, the question there is whether the measure 
falls “within a range of reasonable alternatives” for attaining the 
purpose,100 in consideration of the extent of its collateral impairment of 
the right. To answer any of these questions, the legislative object must be 
construed. A sound and defensible purpose construal is thus essential to 
all three of these steps of proportionality analysis. And it is of maximal 
importance at the pivotal stage of minimal impairment, where the 
outcome turns on an often subtle judgment of whether a given limitation 
puts a scheme on this or that side of the outer bound of reasonable 
alternatives for attaining the object. This was evident in the deciding of 
the Lola case, described earlier. The thoroughness of the Rigorous 
Approach offers perhaps its greatest promise in proportionality analysis, 
where a fair and accurate account of the objective undergirds what will 
inescapably require a difficult and delicate balancing of individual and 
communal interests, comparing at the pivotal step the interests sacrificed 
as part of the limitation on the individual’s right with the societal 
interests that it is the purpose of the legislation to advance. 
It should be noted that in claims of types where the objective has 
already had to be construed before reaching the justification stage, it can 
then be reused, without the exercise needing to be repeated. This is 
evident from Markhali where the Court seized the opportunity at the 
justification stage to rely on the object it had construed earlier using the 
Rigorous Approach at the overbreadth stage.101 
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(d) Other Charter Analyses 
The preceding serve only as a few examples of how often questions of 
statutory purpose are central in Charter jurisprudence. This in turn 
suggests the need to adhere to a Markhali-style Rigorous Approach in 
these purpose constructions, much as similarly-rigorous approaches to 
statutory interpretation are invariably followed where the meaning of 
legislation is at issue. 
Additional examples of such issues can be provided. For example, 
some Charter claims involve an allegation that the object of a law is to 
infringe a right — such as freedom of religion or expression.102 It is then 
essential to accurately construe the legislation in order to answer whether 
such was or was not the intent. Also, analysis governing the section 8 right 
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure requires, at the second 
step, that the authorizing law be reasonable. This in turn prescribes a 
balancing of the societal objectives of the law with the intrusion on the 
privacy interests of the individual affected.103 An accurate and reliable 
construal of the legislative objectives behind the search or seizure is thus 
again invaluable. In the Charter jurisprudence on freedom of expression, 
the threshold for a prima facie infringement is, apart from violence, so low 
that almost invariably the question immediately turns to proportionality. As 
a result, most of the Charter doctrine proprietary to the speech right is in 
fact analyzed as a matter of adjusting the threshold for justification. An 
aspect of this doctrine is the type of speech at issue: the justification 
threshold is lower for speech at the periphery of the right such as hate 
speech versus speech near the core of the right such as political speech.104 
Accordingly, it is important to carefully identify and characterize the type 
of speech that the legislation targets for restriction, in the service of 
whatever larger purpose the legislation serves. The line can be subtle, as 
cases involving political advertising,105 pornography,106 and the propagation 
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  See, e.g., Big M, supra, note 21 (religion); R. v. Zundel, [1992] S.C.J. No. 70, [1992] 2 
S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.), revg [1990] O.J. No. 122 (Ont. C.A.) (expression). 
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  See, e.g., R. v. Saeed, [2016] S.C.J. No. 24, 2016 SCC 24, at paras. 5, 93 (S.C.C.), affg 
[2014] A.J. No. 739 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Fearon, [2014] S.C.J. No. 77, 2014 SCC 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 
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  See, e.g., Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013] S.C.J. No. 11, 
2013 SCC 11, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467, at paras. 112-120 (S.C.C.), varg [2010] S.J. No. 108 (Sask. C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Whatcott”]. 
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  See, e.g., Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, 2004 SCC 33, 
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (S.C.C.), revg [2002] A.J. No. 1542 (Alta. C.A.). 
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  See, e.g., R. v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, 2001 SCC 2, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (S.C.C.), 
revg [1999] B.C.J. No. 1555 (B.C.C.A.). 
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of discriminatory ideologies,107 for example, have demonstrated. The 
Rigorous Approach to legislative purpose construction introduced by 
Markhali may aid these Charter analyses as well. 
2. Implications of the New Rigorous Approach 
The new Rigorous Approach to purpose construction may bring a 
number of important benefits to the adjudication of Charter cases where 
the statutory purpose is a significant issue.  
(a) Accuracy and Reliability 
Markhali’s Rigorous Approach may be expected to reduce the chance 
of error by courts charged with construing a purpose. Several facets of 
the Approach contribute to this likelihood. To begin with, the Approach’s 
express recognition of the “critical importance” of the construction 
encourages a court to discharge the obligation implicit in that importance 
by demonstrating a high quality construal. Further, the Approach’s 
overarching parameters anchor attention on the theoretical rationales 
guiding a proper construal, and point out specific common pitfalls that 
may ensnare less-than-careful efforts. Moreover, the mechanics of the 
construction — including a categorized set of authoritative sources, a 
structure that seeks each source’s available evidence rather than 
reproducing each party’s arguments, a prescribed order of analysis tied to 
general principles of evidential reliability, and an analytical depth in 
considering the evidence from each source — together produce a 
comprehensive, systematic, and thorough construction. A construal with 
these features is far less likely to overlook a source or available evidence 
from the source, to be led off course by self-serving party positions, or to 
provide only a superficial examination of the evidence, leading to error. 
This is at the core of what marks the approach as “rigorous”. 
(b) Consistency 
Because the Rigorous Approach sets out the authoritative sources and 
the prescribed steps to follow in construing a purpose from them, it 
should produce more consistent results than the pre-Markhali regime 
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where the sources consulted and process followed radically varied court 
to court and case to case. This in turn should decrease the need for 
appellate courts to revisit and revise lower courts’ purpose constructions, 
and therefore also the burden on them of doing so.  
(c) Transparency and Predictability for Parties to Disputes 
Since the Rigorous Approach employs a prescribed format explicitly 
laid out in Markhali, it offers greater transparency regarding the process 
used to construe a purpose. This also makes the basis upon which it can 
be expected to decide a statutory objective more predictable. Meanwhile, 
the greater consistency of results also makes results more predictable. 
Together, these facets of greater predictability should enable parties to 
assess their prospects in advance of going to court or even of commencing 
litigation, and to plan accordingly. Even a slight decrease in trials of 
these typically quite “heavy” cases might be welcome, as far as doing its 
share, given an overburdened court system and its consequent costs in 
access to justice for parties. Where a judgment has been rendered, the 
same qualities of predictability and transparency apply to what the 
judgment can be expected to provide by way of justification, diminishing 
the likelihood of surprise and any resulting sense of unfairness. Again, 
this in turn may somewhat reduce the frequency of appeal from the class 
of relevant cases. 
(d) Better Adversarial Debate Regarding the Purpose 
In our party-driven legal system, court judgments are generally as 
good as the adversarial debate that informs them. In this regard, the 
Rigorous Approach to purpose construction should guide and discipline 
the evidence and arguments that litigants bring to court to support their 
position on the legislative object. It won’t do for a party to cherry-pick 
one self-serving statement from the legislative history, and ignore  
other authoritative sources. Over time, the iterative sequence of litigants 
responding to the feedback of courts’ future applications of the Rigorous 
Approach is likely to lead to case records boasting progressively better 
and more complete evidence of purpose, and sounder argumentation and 
counter-argumentation regarding it. This will facilitate the best possible 
adjudication by courts of claims involving statutory objective. 
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(e) Clearer Guidance to Legislatures 
In our system of government with its separation of powers and 
judicial review checking unconstitutional action by the state’s democratic 
organs, Markhali’s Rigorous Approach to purpose construction may 
significantly improve “communications” between legislatures and courts. 
Because the Rigorous Approach is both transparent and consistent, 
legislatures should generally be better-equipped to appreciate what 
makes laws unconstitutionally overbroad, discriminatory in purpose, 
unjustifiable in their rights limitations etc. This will encourage 
legislatures to be much more clear about the legislative object, within the 
authoritative sources that courts look to as indicia under the Rigorous 
Approach. This in turn would alleviate courts being so often in situations 
like that of Markhali: having to construe the purpose — with the 
constitutionality of the law riding on it — with useful evidence absent 
from most of the sources, and the legislative history containing a 
diversity of conflicting statements related to objectives which the court 
must harmonize. The clearer “feedback” that the Rigorous Approach 
provides legislatures about what makes laws overbroad, discriminatory 
in object, disproportionate limitations of rights etc. should equally help 
legislatures tailor the end opposite the purpose in such comparisons  
(e.g., the legislation itself, the limit it effects on a right, etc.). There are two 
reasons for this. The first is that, because the legislature, as mentioned, will 
strive to make the objective itself clearer, it will therefore have a clearer 
benchmark to keep the legislation and its effects in correspondence  
with it as it goes through the drafting process. Second, if draft legislation 
or its effects start to lose that correspondence as the drafting process 
progresses, it will be more clearly and immediately apparent to legal 
counsel advising on the drafting process, thus making it easier for 
corrective action to be taken by the legislature before enactment, 
litigation, judicial review, and invalidation (at such great cost in 
resources) ultimately provide the same feedback. 
(f) Public Confidence in the Rule of Law and the Integrity of Courts 
Because the Rigorous Approach offers more thorough analysis  
and justification, greater transparency and consistency, improved 
communications and diminished conflict between legislatures as 
democratic organs and courts as guardians of the Constitution, it 
consequently contributes to enhancing public confidence in the integrity 
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of the justice system. Conclusory purpose constructions inevitably give 
the impression of being arbitrary and lacking in legal justification. 
Meanwhile, ad hoc purpose constructions at the centre of judgments 
upholding or striking down legislation respecting controversial matters 
have at times even led to inflammatory accusations of either legislative 
apology-making, on the one hand, or activism on the other.108 The 
Rigorous Approach, because it prescribes in advance the manner in 
which it will construe the objective, focuses in so doing on the sources 
rather than the parties, and is comprehensive and thorough, produces an 
opposite impression: that of an exercise based profoundly in law at every 
step, and applied with mechanistic impartiality. It is useful once again, to 
look by analogy at the closely related matter of statutory interpretation. 
In substance, it is an exercise that could generate constant controversy, 
undermining the integrity and function of courts, on grounds of alleged 
legislative re-drafting. Instead, the rigour that has long characterized  
any of the generally accepted approaches to statutory interpretation — 
which, as mentioned, are analogous to and intersect the Rigorous 
Approach to purpose construction — results in statutory interpretation 
being perceived by outsiders as the epitome of a “dry” exercise in neutral 
application of legal technique by specially-trained experts. So too may 
Markhali’s Rigorous Approach do for purpose construction, where  
the charge sometimes otherwise levelled is one of revisionist policy-
making. For these reasons, Markhali’s Rigorous Approach to purpose 
construction strengthens the Rule of Law and helps shelter courts from 
allegations of overreaching.  
IV. SOME REMAINING ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED REGARDING  
THE NEW RIGOROUS APPROACH TO  
PURPOSE CONSTRUCTION 
1. When to Use the Rigorous Approach versus the Summary 
Approach 
Not surprisingly given the newness of the Rigorous Approach, some 
issues around it remain to be worked out over future cases. 
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One of these is the question of when the Rigorous Approach is called 
for, versus when the Summary Approach might be adequate or appropriate. 
In addressing it, the Supreme Court will first have to decide whether it 
prefers to take an anticipatory approach to that question and answer it 
expressly, or to let actions speak for themselves in resolving the question 
implicitly and incrementally. As I see it, the first approach would be better 
in this instance in order to support the rationales served by the 
promulgation of a Rigorous Approach in the first place. Specifically, in the 
absence of a rule for when the Rigorous Approach applies, its ad hoc use 
and non-use will appear arbitrary, undermining the Rule of Law and 
leading to complaints about equal (procedural) justice. By contrast, if a 
rule is presented, it can always be revised as new insights gradually 
emerge. This refinement is our court system’s very stock-in-trade.  
Regarding the rule itself, like any rule of law, it should embody a 
rationality that explains the effects it produces, and must be adhered to 
consistently. A sensible and flexible startpoint might be a rule that the 
Rigorous Approach is required wherever the purpose is a significant 
issue before the court, whether on its own (such as where it is alleged 
that the object is to infringe a Charter right), or else as part of a larger 
legal issue before the court (such as in the examples given in Part III). By 
contrast, if the purpose is only to be cited as background or context, as 
relevant but not significant evidence, or as an element of a larger claim 
the whole of which the court does not consider to merit full 
consideration, then the Summary Approach may be more appropriate in 
such cases for reasons of expediency. As to whether a standard based on 
the significance of the objective to the outcome is capable of consistent 
adjudication, it seems to be that it is the kind of decision courts must 
constantly and inevitably decide in weighing evidence, arguments, the 
merit of claims, competing interests or considerations, etc.  
2. Scope of Application Outside of Charter Jurisprudence 
Another question remaining to be resolved is, whether the Rigorous 
Approach has a scope of application that reaches beyond Charter 
analyses? Having recourse again, by analogy, to statutory interpretation, 
a task much akin to and related to purpose construction, one observes that 
similar approaches to statutory interpretation are used very broadly, without 
the declaration of pre-determined restrictions in potential applicability.  
As noted earlier, the Rigorous Approach to purpose construction has much 
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in common, at the level of rationales for its use, governing principles, and 
concrete sources of evidence, with the general accepted approaches to 
statutory interpretation.109 Thus, it seems to me, there is no evident reason 
why Markhali’s scope of application need be limited to Charter issues. 
Elsewhere in constitutional law, the purpose of a law is an important 
factor in determining its pith and substance within division of powers 
cases. Arguably, a significantly more rigorous approach to consideration 
of the legislative object has already long been used in these division of 
powers cases than in Charter cases.110 Nevertheless, the systematic 
aspect, analytical structure, and thoroughness of Markhali’s Rigorous 
Approach to purpose construction seem capable of enhancing that part of 
pith and substance analysis. Doctrines specific to certain powers also 
sometimes mandate construal of the statutory purpose. For example, 
valid criminal law is said to require a criminal purpose besides a 
prohibition and a penalty.111 The latter two questions are of form, often 
easily answered, leaving the purpose as the more difficult question. 
Markhali’s Rigorous Approach would seem well matched with the needs 
in that context. 
Beyond constitutional law, a question often confronted in 
administrative law is whether a state body or official has exceeded the 
discretion conferred by law. An important factor in determining this is 
the statutory purpose underlying the discretion. As Rand J. famously said 
in Roncarelli v. Duplessis:  
‘Good faith’ in this context … means carrying out the statute according 
to its intent and for its purpose; it means good faith in acting with a 
rational appreciation of that intent and purpose and not with an 
improper intent and for an alien purpose....112 
Subtler cases would particularly benefit from the kind of accurate and 
reliable construal of the purpose that Markhali’s Rigorous Approach 
offers.  
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Many other possibilities throughout the law could be mentioned. It will 
be for future jurisprudence to determine whether Markhali’s Rigorous 
Approach is — like similar approaches to the related legal task of statutory 
interpretation — of potentially broad application across diverse areas of 
law wherever a spotlight is placed on the statutory objective, or whether it 
is to be restrictively applied only to Charter claims. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Rigorous Approach to purpose construction introduced in 
Markhali heralds an important advance in Charter jurisprudence, with 
potentially far-reaching future implications across Canadian law. Long 
the “soft underbelly”113 of the Charter, questions of legislative objective 
are now, post-Markhali, slated to be put to the rigours of a comprehensive, 
systematic, in-depth analysis before they are permitted to decide, through 
their key role in doctrines like overbreadth, discrimination, and 
proportionality, whether laws are to be upheld or struck down. Beyond the 
gains in accuracy, reliability, clarity, and consistency entailed by the 
Rigorous Approach, the advance may yield benefits for all legal actors in 
the adjudicative process: parties may rely on greater predictability to 
plan; courts might see more complete and robust adversarial debate; 
legislatures may gain clarity allowing them to correct constitutional 
defects at the point of origin; the justice system may enjoy enhanced 
public confidence in the very contexts where it has sometimes been most 
questioned. While the applicability outside the Charter of Markhali’s 
Rigorous Approach to statutory purpose construction is not yet known, 
conceptually it would seem capable — analogously to similar approaches 
to statutory interpretation — of broad application across Canadian law, 
with similar salutary effects. 
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